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CRIMINAL LAW
By H. T. O'NEAL,

JR.*

A synopsis of the criminal law as decided by our appellate courts consists, in the main, of a restatement of age-old concepts. The criminal law
does not readily lend itself to startling new trends or changes. It is a science
which is not static, but stationary.
It has been necessary to formulate several very general categories in
which to place the cases, in order that a discussion of them may have some
.semblance of order and organization. Although some of the categories
have received exhaustive treatment elsewhere in this issue, it appears necessary that they be discussed here solely from the standpoint of criminal
law.
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that it is without jurisdiction
to entertain a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, at the instance
of the State, in a criminal case.' This question was laid before the Supreme
Court when counsel for the State became dissatisfied with a decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing a judgment of conviction.
Exceptions pendente lite may be filed in any criminal case to any interlocutory order, ruling, or judgment of the trial court-and no appeal upon
any such action will lie unless exceptions pendente lite are filed.' It has also
been held' that an objection or motion for mistrial, complaining of improper remarks or argument is insufficient unless it states that such remark
or argument is improper because it is not supported by an)' evidence "in
the case. Porch v. State4 lays down the rule (based on Code Section 59803) that a challenge to the array must be made in writing; and further,
an appeal from a ruling on such challenge must be made by bill of exceptions rather than by ground of motion for new trial. Roseberry v. State,' a
matter of ill treatment of minor children, involved a situation in which the
defendant made a motion to set aside a verdict and judgment after her
conviction had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This motion was
made on the grounds that the accusation was a nullity, and it was held
that no such motion is proper in a criminal case. The Court of Appeals
has again held 6-probably for the thousandth time-that a failure by a
defendant to insist on a formal arraignment constitutes a 'Waiver of the
same.
Where the issue of venue was not actually contested at the trial, it is
only necessary that the record show the slightest proof thereof to sustain
*Member Macon Bar; LL.B., 1950, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; Member Georgia Bar Association.

1. State v. Vaughn, 205 Ga. 583, 63 S.E.2d 357 (1951).
2. Key v. State, 207 Ga. 552, 63 S.E.2d 356 (1951).

3. Pressley v. State, 207 Ga. 274, 61 S.E.2d 113 (1950).
4. 207 Ga. 645, 63 S.E.2d 902 (1951).
5. 81 Ga. App. 790, 60 S.E.2d 187 (1950).
6. Sellers v. State, 82 Ga. App. 761, 62 S.E.2d 395 (1950).
( 46 )
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a conviction.! An interesting case in which the issue of venue was bitterly
contested is the matter of Lee v. State,8 a murder case. In this case the
evidence for the State showed that the old house in which the homicide
was committed was approximately fifty or seventy-five feet inside the
county wherein the trial was being conducted, while the evidence for the
defense showed that the house was approximately fifty feet over the line
in another county. The judge charged the jury the provisions of Code
Section 27-1103, to the effect that where a crime is committed on the
boundary line of two counties, it may be tried in either county. This charge
was held proper by the Court of Appeals on the basis that, under the
evidence, the jury could easily have found that the crime was in fact committed on the line of the counties. In motions for change of venue, the
trial judge has a broad discretion which will not be interfered with unless
abused. However, where the evidence reasonably shows a probability of
lynching or other physical violence to a defendant, Code Section 27-1201,
providing for changes of venue, makes the granting of such a change
mandatory."0 English v. State" held that the refusal to grant a motion for
change of venue is not a final judgment and cannot be taken up by a direct
bill of exceptions; hence the proper procedure would be to preserve the
ruling of the judge by exception pendente lite.
It is a general rule that every defendant is entitled to be tried under an
accusation or indictment which is perfect in form. Each count in an indictment must be a full and complete allegation of a crime. What, then, is the
effect of an indictment drawn in three counts, the first two of which have
no contra pacem clause? The Court of Appeals has ruled" that the failure
to place a contra pacem clause at the end of each count is only a technicality which will not invalidate an indictment so long as each count alleges
each element of the crime sought to be charged and the clause in question
does appear at the conclusion of the indictment. Ellison v. State" held that
the failure of a solicitor general to sign an indictment does not affect its
validity-that it is only necessary that it be marked "true bill" and signed
by the foreman of the grand jury. It is now well settled law that in a misdemeanor case the State is not restricted to proving the offense on a certain day, but may prove as many offenses as desired within the statute of
limitations-the defendant being fully protected by his right to. plead
former jeopardy as to any subsequent indictment for a similar offense
during the same period of limitations.0 When an indictment is only in
general language and not in the language of the Code, it must allege
every single element of the offense; for where an indictment alleged that
the accused unlawfully sold whiskey to a certain party, and alleged that
neither had certain enumerated licenses, but failed to allege that neither
7. Flanigan v. State, 83 Ga. App. 835, 65 S.E.2d 37 (1951).
8. 84 Ga. App. 12, 65 S.E.2d 459 (1951).
9. Frazier v. State, 81 Ga. App. 840, 60 S.E.2d 253 (1950).
10. Avery v. State, 83 Ga. App. 700, 64 S.E.2d 589 (1951).
11. 82 Ga. App. 351, 61 S.E.2d 152 (1950).
12. Lee v. State, 81 Ga. Apis. 829, 60 S.E.2d 177 (1950); Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App.
294, 60 S.E.2d 517 (1950).
13. 82 Ga. App. 760, 62 S.E.2d 407 (1950).
14. Key v. State. 83 Ga. App. 839, 65 S.E.2d 278 (1951) ; Daniel v. State, 83 Ga. App.
733, 64 S.E.2d 690 (1951).
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had a distiller's license, the indictment was fatally defective. 1 Brown v.
State16 gives every appearance of being a freak. The defendant was charged
with operating a lottery, by virtue of an accusation which was dated two
weeks before the date of the alleged crime. The State's case showed no
evidence that any crime had been committed prior to the date of the accusation, but the State sought to prove that the date of the accusation was a
ypographical error. Held the court, a conviction under such circumstances
,annot stand. The showing made by the State effectually amended the as:usation after issue was joined, and such canuot be done.
A probation sentence cannot be revoked unless a hearing is had, and
:he defendant is given the full right of being heard. However, the proper
remedy for correcting a wrongful revocation is not by habeas corpus proceedings, but by an appeal so as to have the judgment reviewed; the reason
being that habeas corpus lies only to correct a void judgment, while a
wrongful revocation of a probation sentence is only an erroneous judgment. 7 Since the trial judge is trier of facts upon rules to revoke probation
sentences, he will not be reversed if there is the slightest evidence to sustain
his ruling." The case of Lester v. Foster," presents a decision of great
importance. In this case the Supreme Court overruled the cases of Mincey
v. Crow,2" Wood v. State," and Streetman v. State," all of which cases
had expounded the doctrine that a suspended sentence could be revoked
without a hearing. The court came to the sound conclustbn that the decisions of the Mincey, Wood, and Streetman cases, supra, had simply
overlooked Code Section 27-27o6 providing that the suspension of a
sentence has the effect of putting a defendant on probation; hence, a
party under a suspended sentence must necessarily have the same right to
a hearing as one under a probation sentence. The Supreme Court has held,
in accordance with numerous prior decisions, that a defendant has no right
to a sanity hearing after a death sentence has been passed-the only right
he has is set forth in Code Section 27-2602, providing that the Governor
may appoint physicians to examine the defendant, if he chooses to do so."r
It is perfectly proper to replace or supersede a void death sentence with a
valid one." Resentencing an individual to death may be done in his absence, but must be done in conformity with Code Section 27-2 S18 ,providing that the date for electrocution must be not less than ten nor more then
twenty days from the date of the resentence."
In Ashley v. State, 6 the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law,
an untraversed answer of a trial judge will prevail over allegations in a
petition for certiorari. Moreover, no error is committed by a court's re15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Capitol Distributing Co. v. State, 83 Ga. App. 303, 63 S.E.2d 451 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 673, 62 S.E.2d 732 (1950).
Moyev. Futch, 207 Ga. 52, 60 S.E.2d 137 (1950).
Atkinson v. State, 82 Ga. App. 414, 61 S.E.2d 212 (1950).
207 Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951).
198 Ga. 245, 31 S.E.2d 406 (1944).
68 Ga. App. 43, 21 S.E.2d 915 (1942).
70 Ga. App. 192, 27 S.E.2d 704 (1943).
McLendon v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 100, 60 S.E.2d 753 (1950); Solesbee v. Balkcom,
208 Ga. 121, 65 S.E.2d 263 (1951).
24. McLendon v. State, 207 Ga. 328, 61 S.E.2d 502 (1950).
25. McBurnett v. Balkeom, 207 Ga. 452, 62 S.E.2d 180 (1950).
26. 81 Ga. App. 742, 59 S.E.2d 765 (1950).
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fusal to rule on a traverse where the traverse was made to the answer filed
by the recorder, in certiorari proceedings, where the recorder set out no
facts in his answer.- The reason is that the defendant has contradicted
nothing, since the recorder set out nothing in his answer.
Several basic priciples of our law relating to the charge of the court
have been expounded during this survey period, and it appears expedient
to include the discussion of them in this category of criminal practice.
JFaters v. State21 laid down a ba-sic concept for formulating a charge to
the jury. The judge should determine in his own mind all the findings which
the jury could reasonably make from the evidence in a given case, and
charge the law as to each of those possible verdicts. It is by far the best
practice for the court to charge the language of the Code when it is desired
to charge the law relative to defendants' statements though it is not necessarily error to charge it in mere general terms. 29 It is the general rule that
the court need not charge a theory of defense made out only by defendants'
statement in the absence of a timely written request."0 Hence, it is not
error to refuse to charge the law of alibi, where this theory was advanced
in a defendant's statement, in the absence of a timely written request ;s1 nor
is error committed by failure to charge on impeachment of witnesses, unless
a request is made to so charge. 2 In a case where the defense of insanity
is relied upon, it is proper to charge the jury that the defendant must
prove his defense "to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury," rather than
give the lengthy charge on "preponderance of evidence." 3 During the period
of this survey, it has been held that it is erroneous for a judge to instruct
the jury (which was deadlocked) to consider the time and expense which
a mistrial would entail;34 and, again, it has been held error for a judge to
charge, in a robbery case, that a conspiracy "may have been shown to you,"
for such a charge violates Code Section 8 I- 1104, forbidding a judge to intimate an opinion."
Webb v. State" laid down the true rule as to the right of court and jury
to disbelieve "incredible statements." It holds that this right or power
attaches not to merely unusual or improbable statements, but rather to
assertions which run contrary to natural law or the general experiences of
mankind.
Code Section 27-1901, providing the right of a defendant to demand
trial, was construed in the case of Harris v. State." It was therein held
that said Code Section admitted of no exceptions-that where a defendant
filed his written demand for trial, he would stand acquitted if he was not
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Loomis v. City of Atlanta, 82 Ga. App. 346, 60 S.E.2d 397 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 163, 63 S.E.2d 264 (1951).
Williams v. State, 83 Ga. App. 252,63 S.E.2d 442 (1951).
Peeler v. State, 83 Ga. App. 102, 62 S.E.2d 750 (1950).
Williams v. State, 207 Ga. 620, 63 S.E.2d 358 (1951).
Taylor v. State, 83 Ga. App. 735, 64 S.E.2d 598 (1951).
Walker v. State, 208 Ga. 100, 65 S.E.2d 403 (1951).
Campbell v. State, 81 Ga. App. 834, 60 S.E.2d 169 (1950).
Robinson v. State, 207 Ga. 337, 61 S.E.2d 475 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 543, 61 S.E.2d 542 (1950).
84 Ga. App. 1, 65 S.E.2d 267 (1951).
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tried at the next succeeding term. This is true even where the clerk fails
to spread the demand upon the minutes of the court.
Brown v. State38 contains a very good rule applicable to the situation in
which jurors become separated during the course of a trial. It holds that
such a separation is presumed harmful to defendant and will require the
grant of a new trial unless the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt
that no harm resulted therefrom to the defendant.
A party who attempts to test the validity of a municipal ordinance
through the medium of an injunction is henceforth doomed to failure.
The law is that equity will not lend its aid to enjoin a criminal prosecution; and a- party may not commit a breach of an ordinance and expect
equity to aid by serving as a testing ground for validity of the ordinance."0
The only recognized exception to this rule is where repeated arrests under
an invalid ordinance are irreparably damaging a business or property."
The right of a jury to recommend mercy in a capital felony case is a
mere matter of grace which it can provide after guilt is established; and
it may do so with or without a reason; and this is a proper charge for the
court to give in a capital felony case41
There are several other cases" which were decided by our courts this
year, and which to some extent involve criminal practice and procedure;
however, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss them here in detail.
EVIDENCE

The law in this state is completely settled that illegally obtained evidence is as readily admissible as any other evidence." It has always been
the law in this state that the question of the competency of a witness is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge, but Russell v. State4 carried this
about as far as it possibly could. It approved the ruling of a trial judge
to the effect that an eight-year-old child who. testified that she did not know
the meaning of an oath or the consequences of a lie was a competent witness.
Walker v. State45 reiterates an old rule that is known to every practitioner of the law, but which many have overlooked to their grief. Where
exception is taken to ruling of a trial judge that certain questions may not
be put to a witness, the record vmust show what answers counsel expected
the witness to give to his questions. Our courts are very liberal in allowing
real or demonstrative evidence to be admitted, especially on behalf of the
State in a criminal prosecution. For instance, in a case of assault with
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

83 Ga. App. 650, 64 S.E.2d 313 (1951).
City of Bainbridge v. Olan Mills, Inc., 207 Ga. 636, 63 S.E.2d 655 (1951).
Ibid.
Wynn v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60 S.E.2d 767 (1950).
Jones v. State, 207 Ga. 379, 62 S.E.2d 187 (1950) ; Dixon v. State, 83 Ga. App. 227,
63 S.E.2d 278 (1951) ; Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950) ; Osteen
v. State, 83 Ga. App. 346, 63 S.E.2d 416 (1951); Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60
S.E.2d 763 (1950); McLendon v. Anderson, Judge, 207 Ga. 243, 60 S.E.2d 762
(1950).
43. Hunter v. State, 81 Ga. App. 797, 60 S.E.2d 187 (1950); Carr v. State, 83 Ga. App
678, 64 S.E.2d 190 (1951).
44. 83 Ga. App. 841, 65 S.E.2d 264 (1951).
45. 208 Ga. 68, 65 S.E.2d 172 (1951).
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intent to murder in which the defendant admitted the shooting but claimed
justification, a shotgun was admitted in evidence though it was hardly
identified as the instrument of the crime.4" The reasoning of the court
being that, since the defendant admitted the shooting, it was harmless to
admit the gun over his objection. It is submitted that this kind of thing
is most injudicious and unwise, for the simple reason that any competent:
solicitor general could procure a conviction upon the gun alone if he did
no more than permit the jury to face the business end of it for a few
moments. And in lottery prosecutions it is permissible for the State to introduce all kinds of books, tickets, stubs and paraphernalia for the purpose
of showing the modus operandi, and to show generally how the game
works." In Rampley v. State,"8 certain unsigned notes alleged to have been
written by defendant were admitted in evidence upon a showing that he
had thrown them in a tobacco can to a friend of his who was incarcerated
in another cell block. There is a rule4" that a defendant is not entitled to
have a confession stricken because of a lack of any preliminary showing
that it was freely and voluntarily made, where he did not insist upon such
a showing at the time the confession was introduced. Similarly, bloodhound
testimony is admissible where it is the defendant who first brings it out
by cross-examination, though the proper foundation is not laid by the
State." It is pointed out that otherwise such testimony is never admissible
until the State has first shown the pedigree of the hound, competent training, ability to discern human scent, and that the dogs were handled by the
trainer on the occasion in issue. The case of Royals v. State51 is one of unquestionable soundness. It holds that written confessions, dying declarations, confessions of co-conspirators, and similar writings depending solely
upon the credibility of the maker, cannot go to the jury room with the
jury, as under such circumstances they would far outweigh oral testimony
by speaking several times to the jury.
Mixon v. State" stands for the proposition that evidence tending to
show commission of some other and different crime is admissible if offered
for some lawful purpose. This is the general rule, and of long standing.
That simply makes it all the more deplorable. Capable solicitors general
can and do take this thing and make of it a dreadnaught of deadly danger.
There are, however, some limitations to this evil practice; for where, in
a prosecution for cattle stealing, an indictment for a similar offense of
defendant was introduced against him, the conviction was reversed.8 This
was done on the ground that the indictment against defendant proved nothing-he still had the right to the presumption of innocence under it. Likewise, a conviction was reversed in Mims v. State." In that case (prosecution for rape) a prior rape indictment with verdict of guilty of assault and
46. Benton v. State, 83 Ga. App. 106, 62 S.E.2d 378 (1950).
47. Lumpkin v. State, 83 Ga. App. 831, 65 S.E.2d 184 (1951); Walker v. State, 81 Ga.
App. 741, 59 S.E.2d 766 (1950).
48. 81 Ga. App. 782, 60 S.E.2d 180 (1950).
49. Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. App. 367, 64 S.E.2d 83 (1951).
50. Caldwell v. State, 82 Ga. App. 480, 61 S.E.2d 543 (1950).
51. 208 Ga. 78, 65 S.E.2d 158 (1951).
52. 83 Ga. App. 167, 63 S.E.2d 294 (1951).
53. Waters v. State, 82 Ga. App. 608, 61 S.E.2d 794 (1950).
54. 207 Ga. 118, 60 S.E.2d 373 (1950).
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battery was introduced against defendant. In reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court reasoned that such an instrument could not possibly show
method, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or modus operandi of the defendant
to commit rape since the verdict of the jury upon the first indictment conclusively established that defendant was not guilty of rape. Suffice it to
say that it is the intent and purpose of our law to try a man under the
bill of indictment which brings him to trial-not for some malefaction
which may have occurred many years ago.
Our courts have made several rulings during the past year on the admissibility of opinion testimony. One of these decisions 5 holds that a person, not an expert, can give his opinion of the extent of his own injuries.
Also, the rule is now well established that when a psychiatrist gives an
opinion as to the mental condition of a defendant, he can be cross-examined
as to every fact-upon which that opinion might be based, including other
crimes the defendant might have committed." (It is pointed out that this
is simply another of the devices for using former crimes against a defendant, which practice was condemned in the foregoing part of this article.) The case of Park v. State57 held that an expert may give an opinion
in answer to a hypothetical question based on facts related by other witnesses even though such expert did not see the wound about which he gives
his opinion. A person may give his opinion that another is drunk, either
by giving the facts upon which such opinion is based, or by first showing
that he had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person claimed to be
drunk."
An interesting little phase of the law of evidence as applied to criminal
cases is the matter of "forked questions" which can be slipped to a witness.
Osteen v. State" is a typical, but lovely, example of the same. In answer
to a preliminary question, the witness, a policeman, stated that he was
personally acquainted with the defendant.
The solicitor then asked: "How did you get acquainted with him?"
Mr. witness: "Well, we had him before."
According to the court, simple remedial instructions will cure this
kind of thing. In Flournoy v. State"° a witness gave an improper answer
to a proper question, by simply volunteering the information that the defendant had been in the liquor business for a long time. The Court of
Appeals held that this was curable by simple instructions. This is wrong.
1 stands on
So is the Osteen case. It is submitted that Henderson v. State"
more solid ground. In that case, a witness was testifying that he measured
the lands and grooves of a certain bullet by observing with the eye through
a comparison microscope. In answer to a question as to why he did not
make actual measurements, he replied that his way of doing it constituted
the highest and best evidence that could be had. The court held that this
was such an illegal conclusion of law that it demanded a new trial. The
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Johnson v. State, 82 Ga. App. 840, 62 S.E.2d 837 (1950).
Barton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 810, 60 S.E.2d 173 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 556, 61 S.E.2d 689 (1950).
Spence v. State, 83 Ga. App. 588, 63 S.E.2d 910 (1951).
83 Ga. App. 378, 63 S.E.2d 692 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 518,61 S.E.2d 556 (1950).
208 Ga. 73, 65 S.E.2d 175 (1951).
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court was right. But can it be said that the impropriety in the Henderson
case, supra, was anything like as grave as the atrocities committed-designedly-in the Osteen and Flournoy cases, supra?
The amount of evidence necessary to sustain a verdict, or the amount
of evidence necessary to sufficiently corroborate a witness in the circumstances in which the law requires corroboration poses an inherently difficult
question. For instance, there is the matter of corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix in rape cases. Strickland v. State2 is a close case.
It held that the fact of the prosecutrix leaving the home of the defendant
(where she had been residing), and the fact of her reporting the alleged
rape to her mother was sufficient corroboration of her testimony to sustain
conviction. It is pointed out that in cases of assault with intent to rape, no
63
corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is required. Of course,
64
a confession without corroboration will not sustain a conviction; but
when it is corroborated by evidence, it is said to be evidence of the highest
type." The law requires that the testimony of an accomplice be corrobo6
rated, yet the very slightest corroboration is held to be sufficient." In fact,
accomanother
by
be
corroborated
may
the testimony of one accomplice
7
to
factor
proper
is
a
flight
that
v.
State"
plice. It has been held in WJ/illiams
consider upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
9 in line with the general rule, that it is not
It was held in TJare v. State"
error to refuse to charge the law of impeachment of witnesses in the absence of timely written request. Where a witness is sought to be impeached
by disproving facts testified to by him, it is always a jury question as to the
amount of credit to be given his testimony. 6 Where, however, a witness
swears on cross-examination that the testimony given by him on direct
examination is a lie, he is not, as a matter of law, entitled to credit unless
he is corroborated by other evidence sufficiently strong to satisfy the
jury.71 It may be interesting to observe that evidence for impeachment is
improper where it tends solely to impeach a statement by a witness, which
statement itself was illegally in evidence. 7".

Other decisions dealing with the law of evidence in criminal cases are
not herein treated in detail.73
62.
63.
64.

207 Ga. 284, 61 S.E.2d 118 (1950).
Green v. State, 82 Ga. App. 402, 61 S.E.2d 291 (1950).
Davenport v. State, 81 Ga. App. 787, 60 S.E.2d 190 (1950).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Potter v. State, 83 Ga. App. 713, 64 S.E.2d 630 (1951).
Walls v. State, 83 Ga. App. 318, 63 S.E.2d 437 (1951).
81 Ga. App. 751, 59 S.E.2d 745 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 762, 59 S.E.2d 753 (1950).
Champion v. State, 84 Ga. App. 163, 65 S.E.2d 280 (1951).
Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325, 63 S.E.2d 682 (1951).
Daniel v. State, 82 Ga. App. 535, 61 S.E.2d 561 (1950).
Hamby v. State, 82 Ga. App. 7, 60 S.E.2d 635 (1950); Chester v. State, 81 Ga. App.
788, 60 S.E.2d 191 (1950) ; Williams v. State, 81 Ga. App. 748, 59 S.E.2d 743 (1950) ;
Goldwire v. State, 83 Ga. App. 249, 63 S.E.2d 445 (1951) ; Drewry v. State, 83 Ga.
App. 354, 63 S.E.2d 429 (1951) ; Stembridge v. State, 82 Ga. App. 214, 60 S.E.2d
491 (1950) ; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 352, 61 S.E. 471 (1950) ; King v. State,
83 Ga. App. 175, 63 S.E.2d 292 (1951) ; Garner v. State, 83 Ga. App. 178, 63 S.E.2d
225 (1951) ; Clay v. State, 83 Ga. App. 719, 64 S.E.2d 898 (1951) ; Johnson v. State,
83 Ga. App. 710, 64 S.E.2d 634 (1951) ; Redwine v. State, 207 Ga. 318, 61 S.E.2d 481
(1950) ; Wilkes v. State, 82 Ga. App. 318, 60 S.E.2d 472 (1950) ; Patterson v. State,

65. Richardson v. State, 207 Ga. 373, 61 S.E.2d 489 (1950).
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CRIMES OF PASSION AND VIOLENCE

In crimes of passion and violence, proof of a motive is never necessary
to sustain conviction."4 In line with the law of all jurisdictions, it has been
held that a mere accidental killing during the commission of a robbery
warranted conviction of all participants for murder. 5 James v. State,76 a
prosecution for murder resulting from a brawl in which three were killed,
reiterated the old rule that "the intent follows the bullet," (which means
that where a defendant accidentally hits an innocent bystander, he is guilty
of the same crime that would have been committed against the intended
victim). It was held in Ridley v. State77 that even though counsel for both
State and defendant argue that a homicide is either murder or justifiable
homicide, it is error to fail to charge on involuntary manslaughter, if such
could possibly be found under the evidence; and, further, defendant did not
by his argument, waive any right to except to the court's failure to so
charge. It is not error to refuse a charge on accident and misfortune, where
the same is not indicated either by the evidence or defendant's statement.
Jones v. State is a very similar holding."
Fountainv. State," Farrv. State,81 and Boyd v. State82 each expounds the
same rule, and their importance is of the first magnitude. They clearly and
emphatically state that the defense of justifiable homicide is not simply a
negative one, but is a positive, affirmative defense which the defendant may
prove. These cases hold that it is error to charge that if the jury finds the
defendant not guilty of murder or manslaughter, but was justified, it
should acquit. Such a charge must be clear and explicit that justifiable
homicide, if proved, entitles defendant to acquittal.
Voluntary drunkenness is not now, nor was it ever, an excuse for crime.8 3
On the matter of specific intent to commit a crime, we have had several
4
decisions this year. McCall v. State"
is a matter of assault with intent to
rape. It appears to differ to some extent from many of the old-line assault
cases. Throughout the years, it has been uniformily held that the intent
to rape must be very plain and distinct from the intent to commit robbery,
assault and battery, or some other such crime. In the McCall case, supra,
the evidence showed that the defendant accosted the prosecutrix, attempted
to get her into an alley, then stabbed her and snatched her purse. It is
submitted that the court liberalized its policy when it affirmed a convic5
tion on these facts, of assault with intent to rape. McClain v. State"
deals
with the problem of a conviction of assault and battery under an indictment

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

207 Ga. 357, 61 S.E.2d 462 (1950) ; Hart v. State, 207 Ga. 599, 63 S.E.2d 390 (1950) ;
Cobb v. State, 81 Ga. App. 741, 59 S.E.2d 773 (1950) ; Henderson v. State, 207 Ga.
206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950) ; Cotton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 753, 59 S.E.2d 741 (1950).
Phillips v. State, 207 Ga. 336, 61 S.E.2d 473 (1950).
Lynch v. State, 207 Ga. 325, 61 S.E.2d 495 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 847, 65 S.E.2d 55 (1951).
81 Ga. App. 737, 60 S.E.2d 249 (1950).
Mills v. State, 83 Ga. App. 373, 63 S.E.2d 678 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 474, 61 S.E.2d 553 (1950).
207 Ga. 144, 60 S.E.2d 433 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 855, 65 S.E.2d 270 (1951).
207 Ga. 567, 63 S.E.2d 394 (1951).
Gorman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 459, 61 S.E.2d 438 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 631, 61 S.E.2d 839 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 177, 63 S.E.2d 217 (1951).
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for assault with intent to rape. It adheres to a long line of decisions to
the effect that, although assault and battery is not necessarily a part of the
greater crime of assault with intent to rape, a defendant may nevertheless
be convicted of assault and battery under an indictment for assault with
intent to rape if the indictment alleges facts showing an assault and battery.
Fowler v. State" discusses the specific intent to kill essential to a case of
assault with intent to murder. In that case the instrument of violence was
an automobile. It is therein held that a conviction of assault with intent
to murder is warranted if the willful, wanton, and reckless conduct of the
defendant is such that it would give rise to implied malice so that, if death
had resulted, the crime would be murder. In Dunn v. State, 7 the Court of
Appeals thoroughly discussed the law of assault and battery. In this case
it was alleged that the defendant made some kind of sexual assault on
the body of a young child. He was convicted of assault and battery. The
court opined that a battery was not necessarily a striking, beating or wounding of the victim, but was the least touching of another in anger-and
that touching a child in illicit and perverse love was a worse battery than
to touch in anger.
Citation only to other decisions under this sub-topic is deemed necessary.,
LARCENOUS CRIMES

State, 9

Brown v.
a matter of automobile larceny, laid down the elementary rule that a conspiracy may always be proved in a criminal prosecution,
whether or not it is alleged in the indictment. Further, it has been held"'
that a conviction upon an indictment which alleged ownership of the stolen
goods in an individual (when, in reality they were owned by a partnership)
is valid, if the person alleged to have owned the goods actually had custody, control, and possession of them.
Leach v. State"1 appears to be a hard decision, but not necessarily unsound. The defendant was caught riding in, but not driving, a stolen car.
The driver testified that he, himself, had stolen the car, and that defendant
was innocent. Held: conviction affirmed-both parties were in possession,
hence were particeps crimini. In another case,

2

the defendant was caught

with a stolen car some four months after it had been stolen; and upon the
trial, the judge charged the jury on recent possession of stolen goods. The
Court of Appeals upheld the charge, stating that "recent possession" is a
relative term, and the jury could find that four months was "recent." Although recent possession will not demand a verdict of guilty, it will authorize the jury to infer guilt."" The crime of larceny, as defined in the case
of ,4merican Fire and Casualty Co. v. Barfield," consists of obtaining prop86. 82 Ga. App. 197, 60 S.E.2d 473 (1950).
87. 83 Ga. App. 682, 64 S.E.2d 478 (1951).
88. Eaton v. State, 83 Ga. App. 82, 62 S.E.2d 677 (1950) ; Faust v. State, 208 Ga. 53,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

65 S.E.2d 148 (1951).
83 Ga. App. 244, 63 S.E.2d 219 (1951).
South v. State, 83 Ga. App. 332, 63 S.E.2d 614 (1951).
82 Ga. App. 520, 61 S.E.2d 572 (1950).
Walden v. State, 83 Ga. App. 231, 63 S.E.2d 232 (1951).
Hansford v. State, 83 Ga. ApD. 502. 64 S.E.2d 459 (1951).
81 Ga. App. 887, 60 S.E.2d 383 (1950).
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erty by trick or fraud, under false pretense of bailment, with intent to appropriate to one's own use. Larceny after trust consists of obtaining property during existence of a fiduciary relationship and converting the same
without any malevolent intent in the original acquisition, and it contains
three essential elements-an entrustment, a bailment for benefit of the
owner or a third person, and a fraudulent conversion." If there has been
no actual entrustment, there can be no larceny after trust."°
The Scarboro cases97 treat the matter of embezzlement. A brief recital
of facts is essential to a clear comprehension of these cases. One Scarboro
was indicted for embezzlement (in numerous counts) charging that he,
acting as police chief of the City of Warner Robins, did accept-and dispose of and convert-certain cash money as bonds posted by persons
arrested in his jurisdiction. (It is pointed out that this is probably an
oversimplification of the facts.) He was convicted, and the Court of
Appeals upheld the conviction by ruling that embezzlement may consist of
converting an employer's goods or money before such entployer ever acquired possession of it. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding
that the defendant had not converted anything belonging to his employer,
since neither he nor his employer had any right to accept cash bonds. Hence
the defendant did not embezzle anything belonging to the city. It is submitted that this is a wise and sound decision.
CRIMES IN VIOLATION OF LIQUOR LAWS

Georgia bootleggers probably precipitate as many appellate court decisions in a given year as any other particular item of subject matter. Certainly they were not unduly inert during the period covered by this survey.
The rule expressed in Green v. State"s has been the nemesis of almost an
infinite number of them, and the rule is that presence at and flight from a
whiskey still is ample evidence to sustain a conviction. Proponents of this
0 There, a
rule might look askance at the holding in Easterwood v. State."
search of defendant's premises revealed 103 cans of ice-cold beer in his
house, 5oo empties behind the house, and the ditches of the road adjacent
to his home were littered with empties for a quarter of a mile. The court
held that this was insufficient proof that the defendant was a seller of
beer-he could just as easily have been a lavish entertainer.
In offenses against our "bone-dry law," it is not up to an accused to
prove that his liquor had stamps, but the onus is on the State to prove that
such liquor had no stamps.' Possession of more than a quart of non-taxpaid liquor in a dry county is not a violation of Ga. Code Section 58-1077,
forbidding possession of more than a quart of liquor in a dry county.'' This
is true because said section is aimed at controlling legally stamped whiskey,
95. Lewis v. State, 82 Ga. App. 280, 60 S.E.2d 663 (1950) ; Waters v. State, 82 Ga. App.
157, 60 S.E.2d 798 (1950).
96. Yearwood v. State, 82 Ga. App. 789, 62 S.E.2d 462 (1950).
97. Scarboro v. State, 82 Ga. App. 273, 60 S.E.2d 658 (1950) ; Scarboro v. State, 207 Ga.
449, 62 S.E.2d 168 (1950).
98. 83 Ga. App. 683, 64 S.E.2d 476 (1951).
99. 83 Ga. App. 400, 63 S.E.2d 689 (1951).
100. Ivey v. State, 84 Ga. App. 72, 65 S.E.2d 282 (1951).
101. Fitzgerald v. State, 82 Ga. App. 521, 61 S.E.2d 666 (1950).
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and is not a penal statute directed at bootleggers. Similarly, it Yas held in
Odum v. State"' that a defendant may not be prosecuted for manufacturing
liquor without a license in a dry county under Ga. Code Ann. Section 581024, for this section could apply only where it was actually possible to
obtain a license. In Bienert v. State"3 a duly licensed wholesaler was
prosecuted for making a retail sale to an individual. The Court of Appeals
held this to be a crime for the reason that the general prohibition law is
in effect in this state except where individual counties have voted wet;
hence, no sales of liquor can be made except those expressly allowed by
law. The only sale which a wholesaler can legally make is a sale to another
wholesaler or retailer. Thus, any other sale would be a crime. One decision' lays down the doctrine that a breach of any rule or regulation of
the State Revenue Commissioner is not a violation of law, where such rule
is not in harmony with the statute giving him authority to promulgate rules
and regulations. Along this same general line is the case of Crummey v.
State.'°' There a county issued liquor licenses with a condition that the
county must receive five percent of the gross sales under the license. It was
held that such a provision was illegal as it effectually placed a county in the
liquor business-a place it had no right to be. Several other whiskey cases
are not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant detailed discussion.'
MISCELLANEOUS MALEFACTIONS AND MISDOINGS

Kenimer v. State... is one of the most interesting of decisions. It appears
that the defendant in that case had, for 238 days, violated an order of
Fulton Superior Court con:erning custody of a child. The trial court imposed upon him a jail sentence of two days for each day he had violated
the order (this totaled I year, 2 months and 21 days), and further, fined
him $20.00 per day, or a total of $4,76o. The Court of Appeals ruled
that, even though a court has power to punish for each count of contempt,
the total effect of the sentence in the instant case was so cruel, unusual, and
excessive that it was repugnant to Article I, Section I, paragraph 9 of the
Constitution of Georgia.
The gentle art of bribery is the subject matter of Jennings v. State"'
The defendant therein did not make a direct effort to buy off the officer
involved, but simply put $So in his pocket with the comment that "I want
you to have it." It was held by the Court of Appeals that this amounted to
bribery.
In Gentry v. State"' a defendant was convicted of burglary. It appears
that the defendant was convicted on the basis that he was in possession of
certain goods from a house which was allegedly burglarized. The evidence
adduced upon the trial showed that the door of said house was unlocked,
but did not show whether the window was open or closed. The Court of
Appeals held that, although an entrance through an unlocked door would
102. 82 Ga. App. 134, 60 S.E.2d 522 (1950).
103. 82 Ga. App. 179, 60 S.E.2d 575 (1950).
104. State v. Schafer, 82 Ga. App. 753, 62 S.E.2d 446 (1950).
105. 83 Ga. App. 459, 64 S.E.2d 380 (1951).
106. Palmour v. State, 83 Ga. App. 792, 64 S.E.2d 697 (1951); McQuire v. State, 82
Ga. App. 132, 60 S.E.2d 526 (1950) ; Vandiver v. State, 81 Ga. App. 756, 59 S.E.2d
763 (1950).
107. 83 Ga. App. 264, 63 S.E.2d 280 (1951).
108. 81 Ga. App. 823, 60 S.E.2d 183 (1950).
109. 83 Ga. App. 330, 63 S.E.2d 611 (1951).
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constitute a "breaking and entering," an entry through an open window
would not-hence, the circumstantial evidence of the defendant's possession
of the goods was not such as would exclude every reasonable hypothesis
save that of the guilt of the accused.
The defendant in Cosby v. State"' was convicted of passing worthless
checks. The Court of Appeals, in reversing his conviction, stated that fraud
could never be presumed; and that, in this type of case where fraudulent
intent is an essential element, the State must prove that defendant had no
money on deposit at the time of passing the check, or some other similar
indicia of fraud. Vaughn v. State"' is an interesting forgery case. In that
case the defendant had been tried for forgery and uttering a forgery, and
had been acquitted of forgery. The conviction for uttering the forgery
was reversed; and upon the retrial, evidence that he had committed a
forgery was used to show that he had uttered a forgery. This constituted
reversible error, for the acquittal as to the charge of forgery was res
judicata and could not be used against the prisoner for any purpose.
An informative decision upon the subject of lotteries is President v.
State.12 It was therein held that an indictment or accusation for operation
of a lottery must allege the type or nature of lottery the defendant is alleged to have operated, the rationale of this being that Code Section 266502 (prohibiting lotteries) uses the term "lottery" in a generic sense, and
there are hundreds of types of lotteries-thus a specific type must be alleged
in an indictment.
There is a fairly large number of cases which are not herein discussed,3
for the reason that they are not deemed to be of momentous importance.
STATUTES
It is not the purpose of this discussion to make a minute or microscopic
analysis of the nine pieces of legislation enacted in 1951 which sound in the
realm of criminal law. It is submitted that such a project (guessing what
the courts will do with given legislation) is a luxury reserved for the daring
of heart. Moreover, most of the acts are discussed in detail in other phases
of this Survey.
4nti-Mask zlct."'-This item of legislation--promulgated by the whiplash of an aroused and militant press-appears to be a practical and workable mechanism for accomplishing its avowed intention. Suffice it to say
that under this comprehensive enactment, the wearing of a mask anywhere
in Georgia would be most injudicious and inexpedient.
Juvenile Court Act."-Before opining upon this act, it is essential to emphasize that the opinion herein expressed does not necessarily reflect the
83 Ga. App. 682, 64 S.E.2d 595 (1951).
83 Ga. App. 124, 62 S.E.2d 573 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 731, 64 S.E.2d 596 (1951).
Clarke v. State, 207 Ga. 116, 60 S.E.2d 333 (1950) ; Washington v. State, 207 Ga.
117, 60 S.E.2d 334 (1950) ; Moore v. State, 83 Ga. App. 170, 63 S.E.2d 63 (1951) ;
Troup v. State, 83 Ga. App. 151, 63 SE.2d 4 (1951) ; Haines v. State, 82 Ga. App.
129, 60 S.E.2d 504 (1950) ; Ray v. State, 82 Ga. App. 550, 61 S.E.2d 779 (1950) ;
Wages v. State, 82 Ga. App. 598, 61 S.E.2d 695 (1950) ; Mays v. State, 207 Ga. 143,
60 S.E.2d 769 (1950) ; Gladney v. State, 82 Ga. App. 397, 61 S.E.2d 287 (1950) ;
Parker v. State, 83 Ga. App. 681, 64 S.E.2d 475 (1951) ; Goss v. State, 82 Ga. App.
533, 61 S.E.2d 570 (1950); Lancaster v. State, 83 Ga. App. 746, 64 S.E.2d 902
(1951).
114. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 9.
115. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 291.
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.policy, idea, or opinion of the Mercer Law Review. Indeed, the following
analysis may well meet with disfavor by all who read the same.
While the noble and beneficent purposes of the act are manifestly plain,
the practical application of it is fraught with frightful perils. Attention is
called to Section 9 (3) of the act. Under said provisions the juvenile court
'may assume jurisdiction over a minor if it finds that his "occupation, hehavior, condition, environment, or associations are such as to endanger his
.health, morals and general welfare or that of others." Now, such a finding
may be predicated upon evidence turned up by the court's investigators
(see Section i3), and adduced at a hearing which can be attended only by
persons approved by the judge (see Section 2 i). If the judge feels that
a child has incurred any civil liability he may summarily order such child
to make reparations for the same (see Section 25). Abundant authority
is found in Section 17 for apprehension and detention of minors.
It is obvious that the juvenile court could, under the foregoing authority,
keep a person confined until he reached the age of twenty-one. This it true
whether or not such person has committed any offense under the laws of
,Georgia. It is true that such person may be incarcerated-74or years-simply because a juvenile court may disapprove of his "condition," his "en-vironment," or his "associations." Hence a married minor may be confined
until attaining the age of twenty-one if he has committed no greater offense
than have the juvenile court disapprove of his spouse. The possibilities for
'commission of judicial mayhem under this act are practically without limit.
The course of the criminal law which has increasingly sought, through-out the centuries, to protect the rights of man, has now been stopped in
its tracks. The flowery platitudes of this act cannot close the gateway to
.tyranny which it has opened.
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility dct."'-The discussion of this act
finds a more appropriate place in other portions of this Survey. It partakes
*more of the nature of a civil rather than a criminal statute. Although it may
doubtless impose a yoke upon the neck of the financially unfortunate, it is
a sorely needed law, and should be of inestimable value to the public if
properly enforced.
Public Eating Places Act.'"-This act provides a punishment of a
$ioo fine or three months jail sentence for unsanitary practices in dispensing food and drink. It does not warrant a detailed discussion.
Involuntary Manslaughter.'1 -- This act amended Code Section 26-ioio,
which provided a punishment of one to three years for involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. The amended section provides that confinement shall be from one to five years.
Other criminal or quasi-criminal legislation is here given only footnote
mention."'
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Ga. Laws 1951, p. 565.
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 578.
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 737.
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 697 (Firing of Woods Act, amending GA. CODE § 26-3601
(1933)); Ga. Laws 1951, p. 727 (adopting the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act) ; Ga. Laws 1951, p. 787 (Prisoners Committed to State Hospital for Insane
Act, amending an earlier act, Ga. Laws 1946, p. 46); Ga. Laws 1951, p. 806
(Georgia Commission on Alcoholism Act, which recognizes alcoholism as a disease
and provides for treatment and rehabilitation of persons subject thereto).

